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by Heinroth and Jacobi respectively), though it clearly generated significant contemporary
dispute, disguises an essential unity of philosophical motive. A long chapter on Griesinger
then illustrates the transition to a biomedical motive. Griesinger's method (inspired by
physiological medicine) is carefully separated from his implicit ontology, a separation which
distanced Griesinger (like Helmholtz or Du Bois-Reymond) from vulgar materialist
mechanism. Verwey's patient drawing ofdistinctions, and above all his rigorous concern with
the historical philosophical context, make his discussion continuously enlightening. And, since
a contrast between anthropological and biomedical orientations remains of fundamental
significance in both psychiatry and its historiography (notably, in contrasted accounts of
Freud), these distinctions have wide relevance.
From the point of view of medical history, one might wish that there was more attention to
the range ofpositions, rather than the few central figures, and to Griesinger's contemporaries
and later physicalists. Instead, Verwey is more concerned with the pattern of philosophical
assumptions, particularly those related to Kant and Schopenhauer, and this leads to a long
discussion of the background of neo-Kantianism and anti-mechanism, giving a lop-sided
weighting to the main theme (though certainly ofinterest in its own right). But I found some of
the specific commentaries on general psychology-on Kant's ambiguity about the possibility
of a "science" of psychology, or on Herbart's ontological psychology, for
example-enormously helpful. For the reader interested in conceptions of what psychology
might be, orinwhat historically has been thought tobe rationally required to make psychology
possible, this book is an invaluable resource. For the philosophical issues covered, it is an
accurate and sensitive historical guide.
Roger Smith
University of Lancaster
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Publication of these letters, letters which "stand as one of the high points of intellectual
achievement and insight ofour time", has attracted considerable comment. The double story
of how the letters came into the hands of Freud's close associate, Marie Bonaparte, and how
she saved them from destruction by both the Nazis and Freud himself, and then how Masson
acquired the contract to publish them, only to have the most melodramatic conflict with the
Freud Archive, adds a truly exotic dimension. Few readers, then, are likely to be unaware of
the letters' significance.
The publication (in German 1950, in English 1954) of selected and edited letters from
Freud to Fliess, along with the previously generally unknown "Project for a scientific
psychology" (drafted 1895), provided quite exceptionally rich sources forwhat has become an
academic industry on "the origins" of psychoanalysis. It was always clear that the editors of
thisedition, whoincluded AnnaFreud as well as Marie Bonaparte, tried to separate the public
"scientific" and theprivate "personal" dimensions in thecorrespondence. They were intimate
with Freud's own fears about the public representation of psychoanalysis, a representation
which had always a prominent historical dimension. But the public/private distinction is just
what is always problematic to anyone reconstructing patterns of meaning - whether as a
historian or as a psychoanalyst. Hence a complete edition of the letters (which has appeared
simultaneously in German) is obviously ofgreat value. It is also necessary to historians, since
the original materials remain closed to access well into the next century.
How Masson gained access to these materials has been documented, with all its passion and
conflict, by Janet Malcolm, first in the New Yorker, and then inIn the Freudarchives (1984).
Using the skills and commitment of a team of translators and assistants, Masson has
established what seems to be generally accepted as an accurate transcription ofthe letters and
an accurate translation. The correspondence is one-sided, since Freud appears to have
destroyed Fliess's letters to himself. There are 284 letters over the period of the
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correspondence, including 133 previously unpublished (though not all those previously
published appeared in full). In this setting of an intense emotional attachment, Freud had the
confidence to let his thoughts go, to allow prejudice, intuition, and imagination, as well as
evidence and argument, to construct theory from his patients, current psychopathology,
and-perhaps especially-his own emotional life. Since these letters cover the great moments
of psychoanalysis's self-creation, they are indeed almost without rival as a record of
intellectual creativity. There is also humour, some intended and some not, and many intimate
touches about family life.
In his introduction, Masson states he has "avoided the temptation to speculate or to
interpret" in his annotations. Whether he has indeed done this, particularly in the light of his
very strongly held view about Freud's lack ofintellectual integrity over the seduction theory of
the origin of neuroses (argued in The assault on truth: Freud's suppression ofthe seduction
theory, 1984), has been seriously questioned by Sander Gilman ('Dubious relations', London
Review ofBooks, 7: no. 11., 20 June 1985). I think it is still unclear whether the publication of
all ofFreud's letters will substantially alter our understanding ofthe origins ofpsychoanalysis.
There is already considerable disagreement about how to read what was published earlier. To
interpret letters, where expression is complicated by all the idiosyncracies of personality,
mood, pressures of time, sub-texts of intention or emotion, and sheer play, is an
extraordinarily difficult matter. Freud and Fliess also drew upon a great range of medical and
psychological literature, not to mention their experiences with patients in cultural settings
quite remote from our own. Being fascinated and stimulated by the letters is one thing; using
them to reconstruct a single, persuasive account of some "real" way in which psychoanalysis
was created is another. Certainly, the letters do not speak for themselves, and any annotation
beyond the formal identification of factual references must be considered interpretative.
The letters should finally confirm that Fliess was much more than just a convenient recipient
for the more brilliant Freud's overflowing intellectual and medical ambitions. Freud needed
Fliess emotionally; but, in ways that are difficult for us to recapture (not only because of
Fliess's missing letters, but also because we are unwilling to accept how far Freud was a man of
his time and place), he needed him intellectually.
Roger Smith
University of Lancaster
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This mild-mannered book takes on the iconoclastic task of placing the introduction of
anaesthesia, the "triumph over pain", within the social and professional context of
mid-nineteenth-century American medicine. In the process, anaesthesia is displaced from its
once heroic role as a leading indicator of medical progress to become one more mediator of
intraprofessional conflict and professional authority. Pernick uses the debate overanaesthesia
for a careful exploration of value conflicts within a divided medical profession. While heroic
practitioners and naturalistic healers both, if for different reasons, tended to avoid
anaesthesia, conservative physicians developed a new utilitarian ethic, a balancing ofthe costs
(the dangers of anaesthetics) and the benefits (the relief of pain) in each individual case.
Pernick presents the conservative synthesis-the "calculus of suffering'-as a compromise
position that permitted the judicious use of anaesthetics while preserving and enhancing the
professional status of the surgeons.
Pernick's argument is an endorsement of moderation in both medical behaviour and
historical interpretation. Ifanything, he seems overly generous to thesurgeonsbyarguingthat
their actions were a result of a more or less rational calculus: to this reviewer, they seemed
rather to be "muddling through" on the basis of a mix of personal experiences, social
prejudices, and professional interests. In the process, however, they collectively produced a
social hierarchy ofsensitivity topain: manlymenseldom needed anaesthesia, sensitive (white)
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